Deobandism is a revivalist movement within Sunni (primarily Hanafi) Islam. 1 It was established at the madrasa (religious school) of Dar ul-Ulum in Deoband, northern India, in 1866. It was inspired by the experience of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny a decade earlier and was designed to encourage orthodox Islamic practice in India (then ruled by the British). Deobandism's raison d'être was the preservation of the purity of Islam in eras of non-Muslim rule. This movement of reformist ulama (scholars) 2 were disciples of the revolutionary Indian Islamist Syed Ahmad Shaheed Barelvi (1786-1831), who wandered far and wide preaching Islamic renewal and jihad. The central goal of Deobandist thinkers was to preserve the teachings of the faith during periods of non-Muslim rule. Deobandism has long been influential in parts of India, Pakistan, 3 Afghanistan, Bangladesh and East Africa and today the movement claims to have tens of thousands of Deobandi schools across the globe. 4 Deobandi militants have been active in regions including the West and the Middle East in support of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS). 5 Since 2011, the bloody and extended civil war in Syria has seen Deobandi adherents flock from many nations to fight jihad against Assad's godless regime.
It is an oft-cited fact that the Taliban emerged from the solid grounding of Deobandi instruction. After the Soviets left Afghanistan, Deobani seminaries were often the only source of education for the three million refugees who had flooded into Pakistan (the word 'Taliban' means 'students'). These included the founder of Taliban Mullah Mohammed Omar (c.1960-2013) who fled Afghanistan to study at the Deobandi seminary at Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamia in Karachi in 1979. 6 In recent years, Deobandism has become increasingly influenced by Wahhabist ideology. 7 In the West, the fact that 15 out of 19 of the 9/11 attackers were Wahhabists, 8 along with Taliban connection, has helped make the word 'Deobandi' readily associated with extremism, sectarianism, violence and terrorism. 9 Misconceptions about the nature of Deobandism continue to proliferate and, although the Deobandis comprise a fifth of the Pakistani population, 10 there has been a surprising dearth of attention paid to this sect. This is especially surprising given the focus on Pakistan and Islam in recent as Pakistan has become 'a global center for political Islam' . 11 In a valiant attempt to make up for the lack of literature on the Deobandi movement, this substantial book sets itself the task of answering some important questions interspersed over 18 chapters. 20 So long as the common enemy of Soviet communism existed the alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia could persist.
In a repeat performance of the war in Afghanistan, the US looked favourably upon Saudi support for the Bosnian Muslims in the 1991-1995 Wars of Yugoslav Succession (and covertly used Islamists to arm the Bosnian government).
21 Enthusiasm for intervention in Bosnia was widespread in the Islamic world, and Muslim radicals were strengthened by the perception that the West was indifferent to the fate of the Muslims as the victims of Serbian (and Croatian) aggression. In late 1992, the Organization of the Islamic Conference concluded a two-day meeting in Jidda, Saudi Arabia by calling for the lifting of the United Nations arms embargo on Bosnia. Although this was dismissed as 'gesture politics' it played well in the Islamic world. By this time there were already estimated to be some 400 Saudi volunteers, many veterans of the Afghan War, fighting in Bosnia alongside volunteer forces that included Algerians, Egyptians, Sudanese and Pakistanis. Khaled al-Maeena, a Saudi newspaper editor, observed that the 'war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War … [and the men] who [have] died there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims' . 22 As in Afghanistan, the Americans turned a blind eye to clandestine Saudi aid to fellow Muslims resisting 'aggression' despite the fact that, once again, Saudi aid had an explicit additional goal of spreading Wahhabism. 23 In 2007 John R. Schindler, a former National Security Agency analyst and US Navy counterintelligence officer, opined that while the West agonized over what to do about the Bosnian Muslims, 'on the other side of the globe hard men were doing more concrete things to aid their coreligionists in Bosnia and spread the global jihad in the hopes of winning a strategic victory for the forces of radical Islam' . 24 As it is, and less than a decade after Schindler's pessimistic prognosis, the ISIS was recruiting hard in Bosnia. 25 Those commentators who believe (and argue) that the links between Deobandis and violence are over played often point to the Deobandi's missionary movement as exemplifying an organization that seeks to do nothing more than promote good religious practice. Such naïveté is not sustained under scrutiny and Liyakat Takim demonstrates convincingly that many violent jihadists who have carried out attacks have at some point attended mosques of the Tablighi Jama'at.
26 Discussing Deobandi ideology in a transnational context, Takim considers views its role in the spread of Islamic extremism and intolerance as an ally to the Salafists and Wahhabis. Takim also explains why certain ideological differences exist and the role of the Deobandis in promoting violence and extremism. Takim demonstrates that the Deobandis have a long history as sponsors of jihad having contributed materially to Al Qaeda's terrorism and, more recently, to the caliphate declared by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The chapter also discusses the Deobandi movement's collusion with the SSP (the army of the companions of the Prophet) in its sectarian warfare against the Shi'is in Pakistan. Disappointingly, however, his account does not get beyond the rather limited press coverage of this issue.
27 Disappointingly, however, Takim's chapter only underlines the fact that a thorough survey of Tablighi connections to violent jihad remains a study that still needs to be done.
Many Pakistanis consider the battle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to be the time when their country's problems with violent jihadism began. Pakistan's president at the time, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, 28 was particularly sympathetic to Deobandism 29 and instigated a national programme of 'Islamisation' .
30 Saudi Arabia provided staunch support for Pakistan in its long-standing dispute with India over Kashmir (a situation which the Saudis liken to that of Israel and the Palestinians). 31 The level of Saudi activity leads Eamon Murphy to argue that the Saudi role in promoting 'terrorism and sectarian violence' in Pakistan has been under-estimated. 32 In his study on Deobandism in the Punjab, Pervez Hoodbhoy directly contradicts this and he goes so far as to speculate that even if one took the anti-Soviet jihad out of the equation, Saudi influence would still have encouraged the growth of a highly conservative and sometimes violent form of Deobandi Islam. The attitudes championed by the Saudis spread into Pakistan not only because of what was happening in Afghanistan but also because the failure of the Pakistani state to provide education facilities to the population. 33 In truth, this was always a gap which the oil-rich Saudis were likely to fill.
Pakistan has long been accused of being a sponsor of international terrorism (not least by India). Certainly, its intelligence service (the notorious ISI) 34 has been a long-time patron to international mujahedeen forces, many of them Pakistan-based Sunni extremists, and there is even speculation that Islamabad may have facilitated rise of the ISIS. 35 As ever in Pakistan, however, things are far from being black-and-white. Islamabad thus protests (correctly) that it, too, is itself a victim of terrorism. In this part of the world few have clean hands and all states have to think seriously about how they are going to fight terrorism. Naeem Ahmed assesses Islamabad's dedicated Islamabad's counterterrorism strategy. This was adopted after the fallout of 9/11 unleashed AlQaeda and saw the rise of a network of domestic jihadi terror groups adhering to Deobandi takfiri ideology. This strategy has not been overly successful. Ahmed asserts that only a root-and-branch excision of the ideology underpinning violent extremism will allow the Pakistani state to defeat the urban-based militant sectarian terrorist groups, whose ruthless leaders are well-educated, highly motivated ideologues. This, Ahmed suggest, needs to be accompanied by counter-radicalization programmes, and reforms in public education in order specifically aimed at curbing sectarianism, religio-political extremism and xenophobia.
36 This is all well and good but the difficulties encountered by the UK's anti-terror Prevent strategy -in a society that is far more stable than Pakistan -demonstrate the immense difficulties of successfully implementing such policies. 37 When assessing the prospects for reducing extremist violence, cynics point to what they see as the inherent structural deficiencies in Pakistan's state structures and society. And variations in the attitudes of Deobandis are partly a function of the government policies of whichever states in which they operate. In India, where successive governments have taken a tough line at the first sign of any links between Deobandis and violence, the movement is largely quiescent and has explicitly rejected terrorism. In Pakistan, by contrast, many hardline Deobandi clerics are part-and-parcel of the machinery of the state. 38 Deobandis sit in powerful institutions like the Senate; whilst violent Deobandi groupsranging from the Pakistan Taliban to sectarian outfits such as Sipah-e-Sahaba -are effectively above the law. 39 The fact that Deobandis are so active in the various campaigns against Ahmadis, for instance, is wholly reflective of the Pakistani state's overt discrimination against the group. This official chauvinism includes classifying Ahamadis as 'non-Muslims' under the law. Meanwhile, in the UK, Deobandism remains virtually unknown and yet comprises the largest single group amongst British Muslims, controlling some 44% of Mosques there. 40 In a refreshingly forthright piece, Sam Westrop argues that many Deobandi clerics have strongly resisted integrating into British society. This, it can be argued, reflects nothing more than the traditional British state policy of multiculturalism. Indeed, Westrop opines that the failure of the British government, media and much of academia to look at Deobandi attitudes as a distinct and different to other sets of Muslim attitudes, has been deftly exploited by Islamist and ultra-conservative groups to assert themselves as representatives of British Muslims when in fact that represent only part of that community's opinions. He notes that the British state has appointed Deobandis clerics to be prison chaplains in the hope of that they will propagate moderate messages on issues such as integration whereas they, in fact, do precisely the opposite. 41 In April 2016, a secret official report highlighted the prevalence of clerics favouring radical Islam in UK prisons was leaked. It revealed that extremist Islamic hate literature was freely and widely available in British prisons jails and distributed to inmates by Muslim chaplains. These literatures included anti-Semitic, misogynistic and homophobic pamphlets along with tracts lauding the killing of apostates as a good thing. 42 After initial expressions of concern, these revelations elicited little real action from the political classes in the UK. For too many people in the UK, religious fundamentalism remains a foreign country.
Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan is a step forward in the quest to achieve a better understanding of the Deobandis (and, indeed, of all faith-based political movements). It is a useful contribution to a neglected area of study. On close inspection one can see almost see why there was a gap: it is obvious that the editors of Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan faced a stiff challenge when putting this volume together. It would have been particularly difficult to secure contributors who could, taken together, give a comprehensive account of Deobandism in a consistent way. Some of the volume's chapters, such Abbas Zaidi's analysis of pro-Deobandi media bias in Pakistan, 43 are too narrowly focused to be used for comparative purposes. In choosing case studies one has to be very careful so as to ensure that the subject matter will fit a remit whereby the study of the specific will illuminate the generality. At the same time other chapters within the book, such as Pervez Hoodbhoy's reflections on the evolution and impact of Deobandism on the Punjab, are too broad and suffer from the inevitable constraints on space. A few of the authors deal not so much with the Deobandis, as with the victims of their sectarian violence. 44 These are interesting as standalone pieces -but they do not enhance the volume's coherence. There are also, perhaps inevitably, some cases of unnecessary repetition. (For instance: Jinnah's famous speech of 11 August 1947, in which he declared that 'You are free to go to your temples' , 45 is quoted in three of the book's chapters). These quibbles aside, this is an important book. Regardless of one's view of modern-day Islam, there is little doubt that, in the West, ignorance of the Muslim world remains alarmingly prevalent. In the introduction to Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan, Jawad Syed observes that 'systematic faith violence there has reached unprecedented levels in terms of death and destruction for Sunni Barelvis, Sufis, Shias, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus and other communities. Addressing this issue is of global importance' . 46 This is, of course, an eminently laudable goal, although history and experience give one limited grounds for optimism. 
